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Prologue
It is now generally acknowledged both outside China and, to an
increasing extent, in Chinese academic circles too, that the early Chinese
communist partisans could not have survived without the manpower and
local ties of the bandit gangs they encountered whilst laying the basis for
their Soviet movement. The names that come most easily to mind are
those of Wang Zuo (王佐) and Yuan Wencai (袁文才), the Hakka bandit
chieftains on Jinggangshan (井岡山) who took their followers over to the
communist side and, until their unwarranted execution by Peng Dehuai (彭
德懷) a few years later, were stalwarts of the fledgling revolutionary
movement in Jiangxi. Long shrouded in a fog of propaganda－generated
concealment, their cases have in recent years been elucidated by scholars
in the West,１）in Japan,２）and also in China.３）For many years, comparatively
little attention was paid to the problem of bandits in and around the base
area that was later set up in northwest China, the Shaanxi－Gansu－Ningxia
Border Area (陝甘寧辺区; SGN).４） In China, this neglect was primarily the
result of a concern not to sully the SGN’s semi－mythical status as the
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crucible in which the communists forged their vision for a new China.５）
Over and above such niceties, the complex social ramifications of the
region’s age－old bandit subculture resisted its easy assimilation by the
communists.
Since the appearance of Edgar Snow’s 1936 classic Red Star Over
China , the achievements of local son Liu Zhidan (劉志丹) in blending
revolutionary ideals with the destructive energy of north Shaanxi’s bandit
tradition have become relatively well known. Through repeated failures
and recoveries, Liu Zhidan perceived, as Mao Zedong was coming to
perceive at the other end of the country, that 20th－century China’s
ubiquitous violence left no alternative for the communists but to seek a
military solution. The key to revolutionary success in China was an
empowered peasantry fighting in the name of a shared ideal, and Liu
Zhidan, again like Mao Zedong, recognized that in the remote areas in
which the communists sought to “rest their buttocks”, preexisting armed
forces such as those of local bandits and brotherhoods - even, when
circumstances demanded, those of local bullies and warlords - could not be
ignored. How to win those forces over to the revolutionary cause, or, failing
that, how to nullify and eventually eliminate them became a major
strategic problem for Liu and Mao as well as for other early communist
militants. Regularly condemned by an often－isolated Party Central as
“capitulationists”, “left－deviationists,” or “right－opportunists” for their
attention to such irregular fighters, both Mao Zedong and Liu Zhidan saw
that, under the circumstances, they were all “Bro’s in the ’Hood”, and that
the key to creating a successful revolutionary movement in China was to
bring people together, not to isolate them.
Liu Zhidan’s image has come down to us as that of a man able, like
Mao, to speak to local fighters on their own terms, but just how he was
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able to do that has never been adequately examined. (Unlike Mao, Liu
himself wrote nothing that would enlighten us substantially about his
thinking.) In China, a desire to keep pristine his reputation as a
“revolutionary martyr” - Liu was fortuitously killed in action in 1936 -
brought about a torrent of hagiographic memoirs and quasi－historical
treatments which, until quite recently, tended to omit all mention of Liu’s
links to non－revolutionary (or pre－revolutionary) forces such as bandits.
Conversely, among activists who had faced off with Liu Zhidan concerning
his bandit policy, there has long been a tendency to play down his role in
the revolutionary movement. As far as Western scholars are concerned,
the limited value of many of the materials available appears to have
discouraged them from seeking to examine Liu’s career more closely,
despite his importance as a pioneer revolutionary organizer. While a
number of scholars of the Shaanxi period６） have noted in passing the
importance of Liu Zhidan’s role in negotiating alliances with local bandits
and military figures, and also his confrontations with the Party authorities
when they superciliously disparaged the significance of his achievements,
lack of information has meant that the reasons for Liu’s success have never
been thoroughly pursued. As a result, he has yet to be taken up by
Western scholars as a primary focus of research.７）
Liu’s importance has been further overshadowed by the aura of the
SGN that was set up soon after his death. Yet there is no doubt that the
communists led by Mao Zedong who set about establishing their Anti－
Japanese base area in northern Shaanxi (Shaanbei) at the conclusion of the
Long March in October 1935 would have found the going a lot tougher had
it not been for the groundwork laid by Liu Zhidan. Using his intimate local
ties as a Shaanbei native, and on the basis of “allying with those who can
be allied with, eliminating those who cannot”, Liu had not only created a
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network of military alliances with local armed groups of all political shades,
but also engendered a healthy respect for the communists’ ability to
discipline recalcitrants. By force of personality and skilful resort to family
ties, not to mention a highly flexible attitude to the “rules” of revolution,
Liu Zhidan fostered a powerful subcurrent of ganqing that enabled many
of these local fighters to see the communists as kindred souls, together
with a growing appreciation among them that the revolution, in those early
years at least, was being fought by and on behalf of the poorest levels of
Chinese society from which most of those rural fighters sprang.
The two parts of this paper, drawing among other things upon a host
of fragmentary Chinese materials that are either newly published or
previously ignored, will attempt a preliminary examination of Liu Zhidan’s
activities in Shaanbei from 1928－1932, particularly his contacts with bandits
and other local power－holders, and seek to answer the question of just how
he was able to convince many of them that the communist movement he
espoused was, if not “a worthwhile cause to fight for”, then at least a force
to be reckoned with. It will suggest, among other things, that Liu Zhidan’s
celebrated policy of seeking to recruit bandits to the revolutionary
movement was anything but plain sailing. Not surprisingly, bandit chiefs
ran the gamut as far as personal predilections were concerned: while some
were instinctively amenable to the revolutionary call, others became Liu
Zhidan’s worst enemies. At the same time, the resistance Liu encountered
from his fellow－revolutionaries to his policy was fierce, even vitriolic,
leading to purges and, ultimately, to what deserves to be termed judicial
murder.
＊＊＊
The vast changes taking place in China since the introduction of the
Reform & Opening Policy in 1978 have meant that most of the taboos
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associated with Chinese revolutionary history have been broken or that
they can be ignored with relative impunity. The following episode would
seem to show, however, that an exception still has to be made for the role
played by bandits in modern China’s revolutionary process.
In the second issue for 1993 of the journal Shaanxi difangzhi (陝西地方
志), a short article by a scholar named Li Qingdong (李慶東) appeared
under the title ‘The Bandit Calamity in Republican－Period Shaanxi’ (民国時
期陝西匪患).８）Li, an assistant professor in the Social Studies Department of
the Shaanxi Provincial School of Administration (西省行政学院社会科学
系), may or may not have realized the furor that his article was to unleash.
Within days of the article’s appearance, the families of several former
cadres of the SGN had lodged an official complaint with the Shaanxi
provincial Communist Party Committee, alleging that the reputations of
their family elders had been sullied.
Under severe pressure, the Party Committee and the provincial
authorities launched their own investigation, summoning Li Qingdong for
questioning and examining all relevant documents before finally concluding
that Li had in fact committed what were said to be “serious crimes”,
sufficiently serious in fact to be classified as belonging to Mao Zedong’s
category of “contradictions between ourselves and the enemy” (diwo
maodun ). Not only was Li pressured to acknowledge the “mistakes”
contained in his article; his employer, the Shaanxi Provincial School of
Administration, was ordered to consider terminating Li’s Communist Party
membership. The Party Committee further threatened to take the matter
to the People’s Court if it was not resolved satisfactorily.
Li, however, refused to give in to the pressure, arguing forcefully that
the information in his article was all drawn from contemporary reports and
contained no “mistakes”. The affair dragged on for almost a year, and it
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was not until June of 1994 that the Shaanxi Party Committee reached its
face－saving decision: the editor of Shaanxi difangzhi was to be dismissed,
and all copies of the issue containing Li’s article were to be withdrawn and
destroyed. No action was taken directly against Li Qingdong himself .９）
Li’s “serious crime” had been to identify four one－time low－level cadres
of the SGN - Zhao Bojing (伯), Li Shihua (李世), Zhang Kui (奎)
and Wang Lie (王烈) - as former bandits (土匪) who had been successfully
“pacified” and won over to the revolution. The political tenor of the attack
on his scholarship, including demands to expel him from the Party, was
evidently due to the fact that the families concerned felt besmirched by
the accusation that their elders, rather than being lifelong communists, had
begun life as “common bandits”. Interviewed by one of the present authors,
Li himself opined that the reason why the families had been able to bring
such pressure to bear on the Shaanxi Party Committee was that they had
the backing of Wang Feng (汪鋒; 1910－1998), another long－time SGN cadre
who at the time (1993) occupied the powerful position of National
Committee Vice－Chairman of the Sixth Chinese People’s Political
Consultative Conference (CPPCC; 政協第六届全国委員会副主席). Even in
the 1990s, more than fifty years on from the events in question, such a
combination was sufficient to ensure that Li Qingdong’s article was
consigned to the memory hole.１０）
One－time bandits, it is clear, even “reformed bandits”, continue to
undermine the Chinese government’s official policy of “seeking truth from
facts”. Because of the social opprobrium traditionally attached to them,
bandits remain one of modern China’s last taboos, still capable of raising
revolutionary hackles two generations later, and the accepted “truth” about
the communists’ success in northwest China, at least as far as their
relations with local bandits were concerned, seems to have been
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considerably remote from the facts.１１） (The communists’ recently exposed
reliance on the income from opium cultivation to keep the Shaanxi Soviet
afloat is a parallel case.)１２）
As the Li Qingdong case showed, the enmities engendered during the
Shaanbei period over the question of how far bandits were eligible to be
considered revolutionary materiel lingered long into the post－1949 period.
While the bandits themselves may have been more or less eliminated from
China by 1953,１３） personal animosity among one－time revolutionaries died
harder, and provided tinder for one of Maoist China’s interminable purges.
As we will see later on in this article, when Li Jiantong’s (李建) trilogy
Liu Zhidan , a novel based on Liu Zhidan’s life, became the target of Mao’s
latest witch－hunt in 1962, it had been Yan Hongyan (閻紅顔), one of the
bitterest opponents of Liu’s policy of recruiting bandits, who joined Mao
Zedong henchman Kang Sheng (康生) in the harassment of people,
especially people from the Shaanbei area, who had agreed to help Li
Jiantong with her research.
＊＊＊
Characterized by 19th－century observers as “a nest of plunderers lost
in a wilderness”,１４） Shaanbei was traditionally a place where bandit gangs
and semi－independent military outfits might share the area’s meager
pluckings with the local elite. Bridging the gap between them was not
easy, but Liu Zhidan, scion of a prestigious local family, was ideally situated
to do just that. No one better embodied the twists and turns of the
communist movement in Shaanbei than Liu Zhidan; and nothing better
embodied the social and personal complexities that confronted that
movement, faced as it was with the realities of a local bandit tradition
stretching back centuries, than the fact that Liu, unorthodox and radically－
minded scion of one of the area’s oldest lineages, had family ties not only to
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one of the area’s most hated “local tyrants” (悪覇), Zhang Tingzhi (張廷芝),
but also to one of its most respected bandit chiefs, Zhao Erwa (超二娃).
While Liu Zhidan was sanguinary about the potential of bandit gangs,
with the right sort of guidance, to reform themselves and contribute to
revolutionary change, he also had little alternative. Returning to Shaanxi
from his studies at the Whampoa Military Academy in 1926, itching to set
in place a process of revolutionary change in his native Shaanbei, he found
himself hamstrung by two major difficulties: a lack of fellow－revolutionaries
who could bring him moral support, and a lack of guns with which to add
to their persuasive power. What Shaanbei did have was, first, an endless
supply of armed bandits; second, a network of local tyrants who lorded it
over their locality through their armed retainers (民団); and third,
numerous independent or semi－independent militarists.１５） (The line dividing
the three was not always entirely clear.) Men like these, given Liu Zhidan’s
optimistic view of human potential, would provide the basic building blocks
for his revolutionary movement.
In this respect, Liu’s situation was very different from that of Mao
Zedong in Jiangxi despite the two men’s many similarities. In his dealings
with the two local bandit chiefs Wang Zuo and Yuan Wencai, Mao had the
Red Army to back him up, giving him both persuasive power and
flexibility according to the situation’s needs; in Shaanbei, Liu Zhidan had
nothing beyond his admittedly powerful personal charisma. Mao could deal
with Wang and Yuan as equals; Liu, if not cap in hand, was hardly in a
position to negotiate from strength. Accordingly, it was not surprising that
among the first people he turned to were two men related to him by blood:
local tyrant Zhang Tingzhi and bandit leader Zhao Erwa. In the absence of
a revolutionary army, bandits and disaffected militia recruits would fill the
breach, and the supply of guns would be supplemented by infiltrating and
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taking over local militia groups or some local militarist’s forces (or both)
and taking what was needed (if possible, with their bearers attached).
(Since warlords were always on the lookout to increase their manpower,
they were usually willing and eager to absorb armed irregulars even when
their reliability was in doubt.)１６）
While the winning over of trained soldiers to the revolution’s ranks
had been a feature of revolutionary organizing in China since the earliest
days, the use of bandits had presented more complex problems. Although
their fighting skills and weapons made them highly attractive, their lack of
discipline and limited vision often made them a liability.１７） Liu Zhidan,
however, was eminently practical. Bandits were a fact of life in Shaanbei, a
way out for young men too poor or too proud to find dignity in a life of
farming. Having been threatened countless times by a force of bandits
stronger than his own, Liu had come to understand that the communist
forces, as long as they were a minority, could not afford to isolate
themselves by creating enemies willy－nilly. Bandits with bad political
backgrounds beyond hope of reformation should be resolutely eliminated,
but Liu emphasized to dubious listeners that the majority of bandits were
once poor peasants who had suffered exploitation and oppression and who
would support a revolution that promised to restore to them their lost
dignity; the communists could not leave such people out of their
calculations.１８）And yet, in order to deal successfully with bandits, for whom
vertical relations were supreme, it was first necessary to be able to
negotiate from strength. Liu Zhidan’s first act on returning to his native
Baoan in April 1929 was to exploit his elite origins to oust the local
magistrate and gain control of the county militia, eventually turning it into
a revolutionary force.１９） In 1930, when his fortunes were at a low ebb
following further setbacks, his father presented him with a couple of old－
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fashioned rifles acquired from a local warlord, and Liu Zhidan once more
felt that he was ready to take on the world (with the aid of a few bandit
chiefs, not to mention local tyrants).２０）
Thus it was that, long before the First Red Army arrived in Shaanxi
at the culmination of its Long March, Liu Zhidan set off on what Edgar
Snow would later term a “kaleidoscope of defeats, failures,
discouragements, escapades, adventure, and remarkable escapes from
death, interspersed with periods of respectability as a reinstated officer.”２１）
Here we will take a brief look at two of the men with whom Liu Zhidan
had dealings in the first few years of his revolutionary activity, Zhang
Tingzhi and Zhao Erwa, before turning to consider in more detail the case
of Zhao Erwa and the so－called “Sanjiayuan Incident” (三嘉原事件) of 1932
in which Zhao met his end.２２） (Zhang Tingzhi will be taken up in more
detail in the second part of this essay.) An examination of the relationship
between these “Bro’s in the ’Hood” - Liu Zhidan, Zhang Tingzhi and Zhao
Erwa - can reveal much about the conditions under which the early
Shaanxi revolutionary movement was obliged to operate. The reason for
focusing primarily on Zhao Erwa in the following pages is that his murder
had ramifications far exceeding its apparent importance at the time, and
continued to be a source of intra－Party rankling until well into the Reform
& Opening period. Though the Sanjiayuan Incident has received but
passing notice in histories of Northwest China’s communist movement, it
bore similarities to the purge of October 1935 variously known in China as
the “elimination of counter－revolutionaries” (粛反運動) or “the Northwest
problem” (西北問題), not least in its having been swept under the carpet
for so many years. It would be as late as 1985 before these two “historical
problems” were, in the same official report, finally laid to rest.
＊＊＊
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Dismissed in communist sources as a “notorious bandit chief”, Zhang
Tingzhi (1908－1953), who was not finally suppressed until as late as 1951,
was in fact an influential local landlord with his own private army (hence
the “bandit” label) which he took at will in and out of the arms of both the
Guomindang and local warlords and even, for a time, over to the Japanese
invaders.２３） He was, furthermore, although communist sources not
surprisingly skirt the issue, Liu Zhidan’s older cousin (表哥).２４） Even as
children there had been no love lost between the two,２５） and their mutual
dislike grew in proportion to their age. In 1928, when Zhang was serving in
the Ningxia provincial army, he agreed to allow Liu to serve as deputy－
commander of one regiment (団) of his force, only to have him desert soon
after and join another local warlord in east Gansu, naturally taking as many
guns as he could carry along with a considerable number of men. For this
double－cross, Zhang Tingzhi became Liu Zhidan’s implacable enemy, not
only attacking Liu’s forces and inflicting considerable losses on them but
even, despite the blood ties that linked the two men, sacking Liu Zhidan’s
family grave.２６）
Much more amenable to Liu Zhidan’s approaches was another of his
cousins (姑表), Baoan native Zhao Erwa, also known as Zhao Lianbi (超連
壁). Having lost his parents while he was still small, Zhao Erwa was raised
by Liu Zhidan’s family, and he and Liu Zhidan became close friends. The
cousins’ lives diverged temporarily in their early teens: while Zhao Erwa
became a hired labourer, Liu Zhidan, with his privileged family
background, attended the Yulin Middle School. He took an active part in
political activities there, and subsequently threw himself into the
nationwide communist movement before returning to Shaanxi in 1926 to
begin organizing on the ground he knew best.２７） By that time Zhao Erwa,
like many other local young men with scant means of making a respectable
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living, had already taken to the hills to become a prominent bandit chief.
As noted above, Liu Zhidan had become painfully aware that nothing
was possible in warlord China without the military means of backing up
one’s dreams, and thus it was that the paths of Liu and Zhao Erwa
converged once again. The large force of bandits that Zhao had gathered
around him was impossible to ignore given Liu’s temperament and
practical situation. Eventually, following Liu Zhidan’s patient (but not 100%
successful) efforts to reform their ways, these men would become the
backbone of the early Shaanxi guerilla movement.
Liu Zhidan, Zhao Erwa, and the 1932 Sanjiayuan Incident
On the 4th of February, 1932 (some sources give the 6th of February), in
a remote area of Zhengning County (正寧県) straddling the Shaanxi－Gansu
border known as Sanjiayuan, Zhao Erwa, by this time in command of the
Second Regiment of the Second Detachment of the Northwestern Anti－
Imperialist Allied Army (西北反帝同盟軍第二支隊第二大隊) jointly
commanded by Liu Zhidan and fellow－Shaanxi organizer Xie Zichang (謝子
長; 1897－1935), was suddenly relieved of his weapons by followers of Xie
Zichang. The next moment, in the face of Liu Zhidan’s opposition, Zhao was
summarily executed in front of the officers and fighters of the entire
Army. The episode, which would have repercussions lasting down to the
very recent past, came to be known as the “Sanjiayuan Incident”. After
examining the events that led up to the Incident, we will first indicate
some of the contradictions surrounding it before tracing its impact on
subsequent communist history.
＊＊＊
When Liu Zhidan returned to Shaanbei following the disastrous
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attempts to raise revolution in the Wei Valley, it was with a renewed
understanding of the need not only to have enough troops to make an
uprising feasible, but also to have a base to fall back upon when enemy
pressure became overwhelming. By this time, Zhao Erwa had
metamorphosed into a professional bandit operating with his gang in one of
the traditional bandit lairs straddling the Shaanxi－Gansu border, and it was
this region that would become the launching－ground for Shaanxi’s first
communist guerilla movement.
According to the recollections of both Liu Zhidan’s bodyguard and his
younger brother Liu Jingfan, Zhao Erwa was renowned among local
villagers for his bravery and for being a crack shot with a rifle (神槍).
Bandits operating in surrounding districts also had a healthy respect for
his touchiness and martial skills, evidently referring to him as “Zhao Erye”
(超二) or “Second Master Zhao”, while landlord militia groups were said
to turn tail at the very sound of his name.２８） In fact, though virtually
unsung in the annals of the early Shaanxi communist movement, it was the
presence of Zhao Erwa’s several hundred followers in the ranks of Liu’s
guerrillas that sustained them through both misguided putsches and
vicious government attacks,２９） allowing Liu Zhidan to make repeated
comebacks that defied all the laws of probability.
Nevertheless, the presence of Zhao’s bandits also appears to have been
the reason why Party Central deemed it premature to grace the guerillas
with the title of “Red Army”. Though it has never been specifically stated,
it was very soon after Zhao Erwa’s engineered execution that the title
“Red Army” was first deemed proper, suggesting that Zhao’s elimination,
despite the fuss that ensued afterward, might have been the condition
insisted upon by Party authorities to enable the creation of Northwest
China’s first “Worker－Peasant Army”. In this section we will take a closer
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look at Zhao Erwa’s execution as a way of learning more about Liu Zhidan
and the precarious position he carved out for himself in the early Shaanxi
communist movement, and the enmities that his bandit policy engendered.
According to Liu Zhidan’s bodyguard Zhang Zhanrong, Zhao Erwa
was devoted to his cousin, despite their very different careers, exclaiming
to all who wished to hear that “I dedicate my life to Zhidan, and in death
too I will follow Zhidan.”３０） Indeed, through all the ups and downs of Liu’s
early military career, including the three major disasters that had
decimated the Shaanxi communist movement in 1928－1931, Zhao Erwa and
his followers remained at Liu’s side despite a horrifying attrition rate.
At a historic meeting called in Heshui (合水), Gansu, in February 1931,
Liu Zhidan brought together a number of local bandit outfits including
Zhao’s followers as a unified guerilla force with himself as supreme
commander, only to be routed in a surprise attack by the Gansu warlord
Chen Guizhang (陳珪璋) that inflicted heavy losses and forced the guerillas
to scatter. Nevertheless, the following September the Shaanxi－Gansu
Border Area (陝甘辺区) was formed, and Liu once again sought to rally his
former bandit followers, now scattered amid the mountains of Heshui and
nearby counties, summoning them to a meeting at Nanliang (南梁) on the
Gansu border.
Where others chose to sniff which way the wind was blowing before
taking any action, it was Zhao Erwa and his followers who responded to
Liu Zhidan’s call and who subsequently became the mainstay of the 300－
strong Nanliang Guerilla Column (南梁遊撃隊) formed soon after with Liu
Zhidan at its head.３１） It is hard not to reach the conclusion that, traditional
communist historiography notwithstanding, without his bandit cousin Zhao
Erwa’s devotion and manpower Liu Zhidan could never have been as
successful as he was in laying the foundations for a guerilla movement in
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Shaanbei. Little wonder then that he was hardly inclined to listen to voices
within the Party who increasingly urged him to abandon his policy of
recruiting bandits to the revolution.
Meanwhile, elsewhere in Shaanxi another guerilla column was
emerging. In the spring of 1931, the West Shanxi Guerilla Column (晋西遊
撃隊) had been organized to mobilize peasants in neighbouring Shanxi
province. In the face of concerted suppression campaigns the Column,
commanded by party activists including Shanxi native Yan Hongyan, had
been forced to retreat back across the Yellow River into Shaanbei. There
they came under the command of Xie Zichang, Liu Zhidan’s fellow agitator
at the Yulin High School, who was already doing revolutionary work
among local warlord soldiers. Within a few months this force had also come
to number some 300 fighters, and it was renamed the North Shaanxi
Guerilla Column (陝北遊撃隊) with Xie Zichang in supreme command and
Yan Hongyan and others as Xie’s mid－level officers.３２）
All this activity did not go unobserved. In mid－December 1931, an
emissary from the Party’s Shaanxi provincial committee named Rong
Ziqing (栄子青[卿]) arrived in Shaanbei bearing orders for the consolidation
of the area’s guerilla forces. Following the previous year’s September 18
Incident in Northeast China, the Party had decided that a new tide of anti－
imperialist feeling was rising throughout the country, and that northwest
China should respond to the new situation by making its own anti－
imperialist stance clear. At the same time, Liu Zhidan, who had spent some
time that summer operating as a brigade commander (旅長) in the forces
of his erstwhile nemesis warlord Chen Guizhang, was criticized both for his
“over－reliance on the military option” (単純軍事投機) - meaning Liu’s belief
in the need to merge with warlord forces from time to time so as to win
over soldiers to their cause, what he called his 「兵運」 - and for
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“merging with bandit forces” (与土匪混合) - another basic component of
Liu’s Shaanbei－rooted strategy that he referred to as his 「匪運」. In a
reversal of the Shaanxi Party Committee’s earlier stance, Liu was
commanded to break his ties with local Guomindang (国民党) units and to
take his army south, where they would be amalgamated with Xie
Zichang’s North Shaanxi Guerilla Column into the Northwest Anti－
Imperialist Allied Army.３３）
It was from the start a recipe for disaster, though perhaps no one
could have foreseen the extent of the fall－out. In addition to the need to
consolidate the Shaanxi guerilla forces and present a united anti－imperialist
front, it is likely that the Shaanxi Party committee saw the amalgamation
of the two guerilla groups as a chance to reduce the influence of Liu
Zhidan’s reliance on irregulars. Xie Zichang, though a Shaanbei native like
Liu Zhidan, was much closer to Party orthodoxy and therefore disagreed
fundamentally with Liu’s optimism regarding bandits’ revolutionary
potential. To put the two men in joint command of the new guerilla force
was to invite a showdown on the form that was most appropriate for the
Shaanxi revolutionary movement, and that is exactly what happened.３４）
The new force was formally launched in January 1932 in Zhengning
County. Xie Zichang, being the older of the two by a few years and also
Liu’s superior within the Party, was appointed overall commander of the
new force, with Liu as his deputy. The Allied Army consisted of two
detachments (支隊) together with a Guards Column (警衛隊), with Xie
Zichang commanding the First Detachment, based on the West Shanxi /
North Shaanxi Guerilla Column, and Liu Zhidan the Second Detachment,
based on the Nanliang Guerilla Column. Regarding the chain of authority
within the four regiments (大隊) that comprised the Second Detachment,
some accounts have suggested that only one of them was directly linked to
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Liu Zhidan, that led by Zhao Erwa, and that the remainder were all
commanded by officers loyal to Xie Zichang with backgrounds in the
former West Shanxi Guerilla Column.３５）Other sources, however, insist that
all four regiments were commanded by former bandit chiefs like Yang
Peisheng (楊培勝; aka Yang Pisheng 楊丕勝) who had been won over to the
revolution by Liu Zhidan.
Even with the influence of Liu Zhidan’s ex－bandit units reduced, the
Shaanxi provincial committee (perhaps under the influence of delegates
from Xie Zichang’s camp like Yan Hongyan) continued to voice its doubts
about the Allied Army’s reliability. Its composition was criticized as being
“far too mixed, with a preponderance of former bandits and hooligan
elements of the lumpen proletariat. Because of their predilection for
random shooting and burning wherever they go, they cannot be given the
title of “Worker－Peasant Guerilla Column” (工農遊撃隊) or “Red Army” (紅
軍). To do so would cause the newly－emerging political consciousness
among the masses to come to nothing, and we would become divorced
from the masses.”３６） “The Second Detachment [under Liu Zhidan], in
particular, is no more than a conglomeration of former bandits. Its Second
Regiment travels with some eighty opium pipes. When they have opium
they are delighted to be a part of our Communist Red Army [sic]; when
their craving is triggered, they become like wild men.” The troops of this
Second Regiment “constantly go out to rob people and rape women, and
there is no distinction whatsoever between them and ordinary bandits.”
“The situation requires that the bandit and hooligan elements in the Allied
Army be mercilessly eliminated so that it can be thoroughly cleansed. It is
a fantasy to imagine that this task can be achieved through piecemeal
reforms.”３７）
Against this political background, the events that would trigger the
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Sanjiayuan Incident were steadily unfolding. Soon after the Allied Army
arrived at Sanjiayuan, it was resolved to send Yan Hongyan, commander of
the First Regiment of Xie Zichang’s First Detachment, to Xi’an to report to
the provincial committee there. Yan returned some time later bearing
various Party documents as well as the provincial committee’s directive
concerning the creation of a Shaanxi－Gansu Guerilla Column under Party
leadership. In response to the directive from Xi’an, the Allied Army’s
political committee once again took up the topic of their striking the red
flag as soon as possible, and the discussion evidently developed into a
heated argument.
Liu Zhidan refused to change his stance that their dire military
situation demanded they first allow themselves to be temporarily absorbed
by one of the warlords of eastern Shaanxi so as to try to win over as many
as possible of his soldiers to the revolutionary cause. When Yan Hongyan
and other members of the committee failed to win him over, it seems that
Xie Zichang went personally to persuade his old comrade to relent, arguing
that “since 1928 we have tried any number of times to engineer mutinies in
the army, but without success. We both came close to losing our own lives
in the process! We cannot allow ourselves to be drawn into the enemy’s
midst again. We have a responsibility to carry out the provincial
committee’s directive and formally establish a Red Army guerilla unit.”
In the end, seeing that Liu was not going to come around, the political
committee resolved to hold its final meeting on the question of whether or
not to raise the red flag without inviting Liu or his followers to attend.
With Liu Zhidan left out of the loop, the meeting passed a resolution,
proposed by Xie Zichang, on the one hand to carry out the provincial Party
committee’s directive, and on the other to adopt “resolute measures” to
cleanse the Allied Army including the disarmament of Zhao Erwa and his
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followers. The red flag would then be raised, and the Shaanxi－Gansu
Guerilla Column of the Chinese Worker and Peasant Red Army (中国工農
紅軍陝甘遊撃隊) could be formally established.３８）
The litany of complaints that apparently was being levelled by the
First Detachment against the former Nanliang guerillas including Zhao
Erwa’s followers was hard to ignore. (As we will see later, however, there
is room for doubt as to whether this litany can be taken at face value.)
“The Second Regiment under Zhao Erwa has only 15 Party members, and
a majority of its personnel are former bandits. While we were camped at
Sanjiayuan, Zhao’s unit sent men out every night to rob, rape and pillage.
Making no distinction between rich and poor, they would steal anything
they laid their eyes on and rape any woman who came their way, leading
the masses to complain bitterly. Their actions have created a gulf between
the Red Army [sic] and the masses… The army’s fighters also became
furious at the behaviour of Zhao Erwa’s bandit troops, and strongly
demanded that they be purged so that army discipline could be restored.”３９）
“More than half the soldiers of the Second Detachment are opium smokers
who even go so far as to deal in opium themselves.”４０）
Xie Zichang himself is said to have pointed out on numerous occasions
the serious problems of the communist forces’ makeup: “Is an army really
capable of carrying out a revolution when its soldiers go out to rob and
rape at will?” he asked. “Zhao Erwa is a bandit, and he is tarnishing our
reputation.”４１）In response to Xie’s warning, Yan Hongyan and others called
a mass meeting which decided to create a special Disciplinary Unit (執法
隊) consisting of some 50－60 men, empowered to punish all officers or men
found guilty of transgressions of mass discipline.４２）
Zhao Erwa was not oblivious to the concerns of his fellow－
commanders in the Allied Army. Some time before the Sanjiayuan Incident
Liu Zhidan and his “Bro’s in the ’Hood”:
Bandits and Communists in the Shaanbei Badlands (1)
－１６５－
took place, in response to the urging of his second－in－command, Liu
Zhidan’s younger cousin (堂弟) Liu Jingfan (	景范), Zhao Erwa shrugged:
“If Zhidan says reform the troops, so be it; there is nothing further for me
to say.” Zhao even voluntarily submitted a list of the men under his
command deserving to be weeded out.４３） Whatever steps he took were
evidently not enough to satisfy his critics, however, and the hours
remaining before his death ticked by remorselessly.
The mystery of Zhao Erwa’s apparent failure to bring his troops under
control even after so many years of fighting alongside Liu Zhidan is made
deeper by Liu’s own well－known insistence on the need for strict guerilla
discipline. One - perhaps hagiographical - story relates an episode that
took place while Liu’s unit was encamped at Zhengning, Gansu. As the unit
was preparing to leave, a groom attached to the unit’s headquarters stole a
cotton belt and a chicken from one of the local families, leading the locals
to lodge a complaint with Liu Zhidan. The next day, as the guerillas
marched through a small village, Liu called a public meeting of the entire
column at which the groom was put on trial. Taking into account the fact
that this was not the first time that the man had been found guilty of an
infraction of discipline, the soldiers of the column resolved unanimously
that he should be immediately shot.４４） When it came to disciplining his
cousin Zhao Erwa, however, these sources suggest that Liu declined to
take steps, and so the events of February 1932 became inevitable. As has
been noted above, on February 4, 1932 Zhao Erwa was disarmed and
executed.
Following Zhao Erwa’s execution, the Guards Unit also disarmed the
soldiers of the Second Detachment - effectively, the men belonging to the
Nanliang Guerilla Column - and announced the guerillas’ new policy:
“Those wishing to become a part of the Red Army may remain. Others are
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free to leave, but they will not be permitted to return to banditry.” In
principle, older fighters would be given money to help them on their way.
Younger ones who wished to join the revolution would be allowed to
remain but only after undergoing rigorous training ; the rest would be
allowed to leave. By the time the task of scrutinizing each fighter’s record
was finished, the Second Detachment was left with some 70~80 men, 30~
40 others having chosen to leave.４５） In response to Liu Zhidan’s protest at
the confiscation of the Second Regiment’s weapons, Xie Zichang responded:
“We have relieved some bandits of their weapons; that is not the same as
calling you a bandit.”４６）
Thus ran the standard account of the events at Sanjiayuan, but Xie
Zichang’s response to Liu Zhidan’s protest was highly disingenuous since
what had happened was in fact the disarming of the entire former
Nanliang Guerilla Column (including, it seems, Liu Zhidan himself). While
the affair appeared on the surface to be no more than the disciplining of a
recalcitrant bandit chief deemed incapable of living up to the ideals of the
communist revolution, in fact it amounted to a showdown between two
distinct factions. The Sanjiayuan Incident brought to a head simmering
discontent within the revolutionary movement in the northwest,
personified by Liu Zhidan and Xie Zichang, and its repercussions were
both profound and long－lasting. Recently published materials, including a
biography of Shaanxi veteran Gao Gang, have confirmed that there was far
more to the incident than met the eye.
Historical Ramifications of the Sanjiayuan Incident
In the short run, as one historian of the Shaanxi－Gansu Border Area
has suggested, the Sanjiayuan Incident “seriously weakened the
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Northwestern Anti－Imperialist Allied Army”.４７） Liu Zhidan, who had been
forced to watch the disarming and execution of a cousin who, for all his
faults, had supported him through thick and thin since he first took up the
cause of the Shaanxi revolution, left as soon as he could to tell his version
of the day’s events to the Shaanxi Party Committee in Xi’an. On the
following day, Zhao Erwa’s deputy Liu Jingfan, together with munitions
officer Ma Xiwu (馬錫五), resigned their commissions in the Second
Regiment and returned to their native Baoan in protest at the treatment
meted out to Zhao Erwa and at the forced requisitioning of the regiment’s
weapons. Most of the fighters, those with bandit backgrounds as well as
others from the Nanliang Guerilla Column, perhaps seeing the writing on
the wall, also began to drift away. Some of them, it has been alleged, had
even hatched a plan to assassinate both Xie Zichang and Yan Hongyan
before they left.４８）
Two months went by before Liu Zhidan returned to Shaanbei. In the
meantime, the Allied Army’s ranks duly “purified”, it was reorganized as
the Shaanxi－Gansu Guerilla Column of the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’
Red Army under the overall command of Xie Zichang, with Xie’s
lieutenants, including Yan Hongyan, as regimental commanders.４９）
While no record has been found of the discussions that took place
during Liu Zhidan’s time in Xi’an, it would seem that the Shaanxi
Provincial Committee (which had, after all, initially promoted not only the
infiltration of warlord units but also the mobilization of Shaanbei’s
bandits)５０） took his side. At the end of February, after first sending Liu
Zhidan on a mission to organize peasants in the Weibei area of southern
Shaanxi, the Committee quietly dispatched Secretary Du Heng (杜衡) to
Shaanbei on a “tour of inspection”. The newly－created guerilla force, now
operating under Xie Zichang, had twice been repelled with considerable
桃山学院大学人間科学 No. 44
－１６８－
losses in its recent attempts to take a local town, and Du’s criticism was
scathing: the Guerilla Column (遊撃隊; literally, “roving attack force”) was
in fact “roving without attacking” (遊而不撃), and was having no more
effect than mountain bandits (梢山主義). Citing these failed attacks, Du
annulled Xie Zichang’s commission as commander in chief before returning
to Xi’an to report to the Party Committee.５１）
In the middle of April Du Heng returned to Shaanbei, this time
accompanied by Liu Zhidan, to communicate the Provincial Committee’s
decision. The Shaanxi－Gansu Guerilla Column would be reorganized into
two detachments, the 3rd and 5th, with Liu Zhidan heading the former and
Yan Hongyan the latter. Xie Zichang was dismissed and sent to Gansu to
work among soldiers there. (He would return to Shaanbei later after things
had quietened down.) On the 20th of April the Party Central Committee,
confirming the decision, further decreed that the Shaanxi－Gansu Guerilla
Column would become the 42nd Division of the 26th Chinese Workers’ and
Peasants’ Red Army (中国工農紅軍二十六軍第四十二師). Finally, on May
10, overall command of the Column was handed over to Liu Zhidan.５２）
The history of the communist movement in China is as much one of
personal animosity as one of political struggle, and the Sanjiayuan
Incident’s extended repercussions were a good example. At the root of the
affair, as noted above, was a deep factional divide between Liu Zhidan’s
Nanliang Guerilla Column and Xie Zichang’s West Shanxi / North Shaanxi
Guerilla Column over what kind of revolutionary movement was most
appropriate to the conditions of Shaanbei. That rivalry had ramifications
that persisted into the 1990s, creating yet another “winners vs. losers”
divide in Chinese communist history - the very same circumstances that
Li Qingdong would decry - and fuelling the appearance of opposing sets of
memoirs in which one side sought to paint its own protagonist in
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revolutionary colours while passing fleetingly over the achievements of the
other. A careful look at two collections of revolutionary memoirs and oral
interviews that appeared in the mid－ to late 1990s is illuminating.
The first collection to appear, in 1995, was titled The 26 th Red Army
and the Shaanxi －Gansu Soviet Area (紅二十六軍与陝甘辺蘇区; hereafter
HELJ),５３） an extensive array of oral reminiscences by survivors of the
Shaanxi guerilla years including veteran cadres of both the Nanliang
Guerilla Column and the West Shanxi / North Shaanxi Guerilla Column.
Two years later, another set of reminiscences appeared bearing the title
The Shaanxi －Gansu Border Area Revolutionary Base (陝甘辺革命根拠地;
hereafter SGBG).５４） Examining the two volumes, one is first struck by the
comparative absence from the latter volume, SGBG, of any memoirs
related by veterans of Liu Zhidan’s Nanliang Guerilla Column, and
subsequently by the fact that only the former volume, HELJ, has a section
dealing specifically with the Sanjiayuan Incident. It is no coincidence that
the litany of complaints against Zhao Erwa cited on the preceding pages
were all from SGBG, while the suggestion that the events at Sanjiayuan
dealt a serious blow to the Shaanxi revolutionary movement is from HELJ.
Regarding the accusations of continued bandit activity by Zhao Erwa’s
followers even after the formation of the Northwestern Anti－Imperialist
Allied Army, again there is a divergence between the two texts. Those on
Liu Zhidan’s side of the argument insist that, following the Allied Army’s
formation, a purge of the Second Regiment’s ranks had already weeded out
numerous recalcitrant hooligan types. At the same time, they assert, the
difficulty of making ends meet had caused the entire army to make a
decision to go out to “attack a few local bullies” (打土豪), and Xie Zichang’s
men had been just as active in those activities as had those of Liu Zhidan.
While Zhao Erwa’s followers, under cover of these raids, had also helped
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themselves to the pigs of ordinary peasants and sometimes pursued such
requisitions “too enthusiastically” (太過火了),５５） no one was entirely free
from accusations of bandit－like behaviour. Yang Peisheng, another former
bandit chief serving under Liu Zhidan who had ranked equally with Zhao
Erwa, also pointed out in his reminiscences that Xie Zichang’s men had
robbed and killed people just like anyone else: “How were they going to
explain that away?” “Zhao Erwa”, Yang insisted, “was killed unjustly.”５６）Pro－
Liu Zhidan accounts further insisted that the Sanjiayuan Incident had been
a case of one faction seeking to eliminate another, “an attempt to
extinguish the revolutionary forces, a criminal action that aided the enemy,
not our own side”.５７）As Liu Jingfan put it to researchers who interviewed
him shortly before his death in the 1980s, Xie Zichang himself had
sometimes been “overly ‘left’” (「左」得很).５８）(Not surprisingly, Xie Zichang’s
official biography, written by two local Party historians, makes no mention
of the Sanjiayuan affair whatsoever.)５９）
Concerning the true nature of the events that transpired at
Sanjiayuan, sources associated with Liu Zhidan, as cited in HELJ and
elsewhere, also differ considerably from the version outlined in the
previous pages. In contrast to the assertion that Liu himself was not
disarmed by Xie Zichang’s men, participant Liu Jingfan, Liu Zhidan’s
younger cousin, relates the story in dramatic detail:
“As soon as Xie [Zichang] shouted the password, ‘Some of us are
hanging up sheep and selling dog－meat!’, commander of the Guards
Division Bai Xilin (白
林) pinioned Zhao Lianbi [Erwa]’s arms,
whereupon Yao Hongyan took out his Mauser pistol and shot Zhao
once in the temple, causing him to fall to the ground dead. Yan then
turned to Liu Zhidan and snatched away his Mauser pistol while Wu
Daifeng (呉岱峰) took mine. After this, the men of the Guards Division
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opened fire on the Second Regiment, [killing or wounding several of its
officers] before moving forward to take away the weapons of the
entire Second Regiment.”６０）
If Liu Jingfan’s account of Liu Zhidan being relieved of his Mauser
pistol immediately following Zhao Erwa’s execution is true, it would
account for Liu’s apparent passivity as the events unfolded. More than one
eyewitness has made reference to how he squatted wordlessly to one side,
sunk in depression, his spirits low, the life seemingly gone out of him;６１）Liu
was even denied the right to speak to Liu Jingfan.６２）All the evidence, that
is, suggests that Sanjiayuan was in fact a classic coup d’état carried out by
Xie Zichang, who had from the beginning been unable to share Liu
Zhidan’s enthusiasm for recruiting bandits.
Our examination of the two volumes of reminiscences revealed some
further interesting points. On Zhao Erwa himself, for instance,
reminiscences by cadres of the West Shanxi / North Shaanxi Guerilla
Column refer to him as a “bandit” (土匪),６３） while those of the Nanliang
Guerilla Column (notably Liu Jingfan and Yang Peisheng) take a much
more charitable view of Zhao. On the events that took place at Sanjiayuan,
the memoirs presented in SGBG of the four West Shanxi Guerilla Column
veterans mentioned above, along with that of another West Shanxi veteran
Ma Yunze, present highly detailed and self－justificatory accounts of the
affair, while the Nanliang Guerilla Column is represented by only Liu
Jingfan and Yang Peisheng, both of whom, particularly Yang Peisheng,
skate relatively quickly over the events. (Ma Yunze’s memoir even asserts
that Zhao Erwa was executed for attempting an armed mutiny.)６４） HELJ,
on the other hand, is a rich assemblage of memoirs by individuals from
each side of the factional divide.
As if the implications of these contrasts were not enough, the two
桃山学院大学人間科学 No. 44
－１７２－
volumes also took differing approaches to the presentation of the data they
assembled. While HELJ presented each interview transcript verbatim with
no evidence of editorial interference, the texts assembled by SGBG all
show signs of an editor’s hand. Again, while the interviewees represented
in HELJ included both individuals who later fell away from the revolution
and people who played no more than minor parts in the guerilla
movement, the authors assembled in SGBG are without exception the
“heroes” of the piece, people who became major players following
“Liberation” in 1949. It is hard to resist the conclusion that the SGBG
pieces had been hastily assembled as a reaction to the publication of HELJ
two years before, with the primary objective of underwriting their own
man’s - i.e. Xie Zichang’s - contribution to the Shaanxi revolution
including a justification of the events at Sanjiayuan.
＊＊＊
It is no coincidence that memoirs by veterans of Liu Zhidan’s Nanliang
Guerilla Column tend to be fewer in number than those representing Xie
Zichang’s West Shanxi / North Shaanxi Guerilla Column. In the first place,
cadres who had served under Xie Zichang and who rose to occupy
important posts after 1949 far outnumbered those who had formerly been
followers of Liu Zhidan.６５）Even more crucial was the far－reaching influence
of the 1962 Liu Zhidan affair referred to at the beginning of this article.６６）
In 1956, established Party writer Li Jiantong had been requested to write a
biography of her second cousin Liu Zhidan for a series designed to extol
communist martyrs. Against the advice of her husband, Liu Jingfan, as well
as of others who, from bitter experience, were wary of the shifting tides of
opinion within the Party (particularly regarding its Shaanbei legacy), Li
allowed herself to be persuaded to go ahead with the project, ultimately
deciding that a novelistic format would be more suitable than a simple
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biography.６７）
Even before the text had been formally published, following the
publication of a few excerpts in various newspapers, it ran into problems.
When Yan Hongyan, a former stalwart of the West Shanxi / North Shaanxi
Guerilla Columns and staunch opponent of Liu Zhidan’s bandit policy,
happened to see a draft of the novel, he immediately contacted Party
ideologist Kang Sheng, who in turn saw a way of ingratiating himself with
Mao Zedong by suggesting that Li Jiantong’s aim in reviving the memory
of Liu Zhidan was to seek to overturn the 1954 guilty verdict against Liu’s
close confederate Gao Gang so as to split the Party against itself in the
same way that the Shaanxi movement had once split.６８） There was the
further implication that she was trying to set Liu Zhidan’s legacy up to
rival that of Mao Zedong. (Lingering suspicions that Liu’s death in action in
1936 was, in fact, engineered by a jealous Mao have refused to die.) Mao,
more and more paranoid since the split with Peng Dehuai a few years
before, agreed with Kang’s analysis and bitterly criticized Li’s manuscript
as an “anti－Party novel” (反党小説). Subsequently, not only Li Jiantong
herself and her husband Liu Jingfan, but all the veterans who had formerly
been associated with the Liu Zhidan side and who had cooperated with her
research for the novel suffered fierce recriminations, especially during the
“Cultural Revolution” that followed soon after. By the time of the Cultural
Revolution’s conclusion in 1976, they had been reduced to a small minority
among surviving Party cadres compared to Xie Zichang’s former followers.
The facts of the Liu Zhidan affair have been admirably set out by
David Holm and there is no need to reiterate them here.６９）As Holm shows,
the origins of the affair went back to the October 1935 “elimination of
counter－revolutionaries” campaign, sometimes referred to as the “North－
West problem”, in which numerous leaders of the Shaanxi revolutionary
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movement including Liu Zhidan and Gao Gang had been stripped of their
posts and imprisoned (and many more killed) following the arrival in the
northwest of hardline communists critical of what was labelled their
“rightwing deviationism”. Although these people were ordered to be
released by Mao Zedong when he too arrived a few weeks later at the
head of the First Red Army after completing the Long March, those
responsible, far from being punished, remained in positions of authority in
the Party and Soviet government in Yanan and even after 1949. Not
surprisingly, the affair remained a persistent source of bad feeling among
the communists in northwest China throughout the following years.７０）
After 1949, lest they make the Communist Party appear less saintly
than it wished to be seen, these “unsettled cases” (懸案) had been swept
under the carpet.７１） Li Jiantong’s crime had been in her having
inadvertently brought them to the surface through her novel Liu Zhidan ,
thus treading on a large number of very powerful toes. The result was a
purge that left very few survivors among those once associated with the
“revolutionary hero” Liu Zhidan.
Though the two events were quite separate, the origins of the 1935
purge in turn harked back to the apparently insignificant 1932 Sanjiayuan
Incident. On the face of it no more than the elimination of a troublesome
former bandit, necessary in order to permit the raising of the red flag for
the first time in northwest China, the Sanjiayuan Incident should rather be
seen as the precursor of a chain of events rooted in personal and political
animosities and rivalries among the Shaanxi communists that contributed
in no small degree to the 1935 purge. Not least among those rivalries was
that between followers of Xie Zichang and those of Liu Zhidan. Allegiances
to one or other of the two factions were strong, and the clash between the
two men over the viability of Shaanxi’s bandits in the province’s
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revolutionary movement provided the spark that lit the fuse.
The division was probably broadened by social factors operating in the
rural Shaanbei environment. The appeal of local leaders like Liu Zhidan
and Xie Zichang lay not merely in their organizing ability and
revolutionary credentials, but also in their personal charisma and
indigenous roots. In such an environment, loyalties tended to be personal
rather than ideological. Naturally, each of the two men made full use of
those qualities to create the conditions for revolution in their immediate
surrounding area. The extraordinary setbacks and difficulties which the
Party had to endure in order to maintain a foothold in Shaanbei made their
local appeal especially strong. The result was the emergence of two quite
distinct factions, each tied intimately to one or other of the two leaders: Liu
Zhidan’s Nanliang Guerilla Column and Xie Zichang’s West Shanxi / North
Shaanxi Guerilla Column. When a conflict arose between the two, as
happened at Sanjiayuan, the stand－off, because of the nature of the
relationship between leadership and followers, was likely to be both
absolute and highly subjective, with the consequent likelihood of bloodshed.
If the short－term result of Sanjiayuan was the murder of Zhao Erwa, the
long－term result was the ossification of the two sides, reflected ultimately
in the appearance of rival sets of memoirs, a legacy of mutual mistrust that
lingered for more than half a century, and the throwing of a smokescreen
over the complex legacy of Liu Zhidan.
It would be more than fifty years before the Communist Party finally
managed to draw a line under the Sanjiayuan Incident. In 1983, free at last
of Mao’s control, Deng Xiaoping ordered the newly－formed Central
Advisory Commission (中共中央顧問委員会) to assume responsibility for
laying the “Northwest problem” (and, coincidentally, the Sanjiayuan
Incident) to rest. Over the spring and summer of that year, surviving
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veterans of the Shaanbei revolutionary movement, including both the
Nanliang and West Shanxi / North Shaanxi factions, were brought together
in Beijing for a series of study meetings to discuss and reach a unanimous
conclusion regarding this much－disputed historical problem. Under the
circumstances, such a conclusion was not easily reached, and bitter
arguments evidently broke out causing the talks to be abandoned. In
September 1985, finally, under the coaxing of Party Secretary Hu Yaobang,
a second series of meetings was called. In one of the few official Party
documents to mention the Sanjiayuan Incident by name, the Commission’s
“Report on the Discussion Meetings Concerning Some Historical Problems
of the Red Army’s Struggle in the Northwest” (「関于西北紅軍戦争歴史問題
座談会的報告」), finally released in 1986, concluded:
Since the composition of the [Northwest China Anti－Imperialist
Allied Army’s] ranks had been imperfect, its work－style (作風) and
discipline poor, it was necessary to carry out a cleansing of the ranks
in line with the Party’s principles for army－building (建軍原則).
However, for one faction to adopt the method of commandeering the
other faction’s weapons and even go so far as to take someone’s life,
particularly when there was disagreement on the matter between the
two principal leaders Liu Zhidan and Xie Zichang, cannot be said to be
a correct decision regardless of who made it. Fortunately, a number of
the comrades in the [Allied Army], understanding the overall situation,
steadfastly supported the revolution and made important contributions
to the development of the revolution in the Northwest and of the Red
Army. Outstanding among those comrades was Comrade Liu Zhidan.
More than half a century has passed since those events, and most of
the leading comrades of the time have already passed away. What is
important right now is to conscientiously draw out the lessons of this
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experience, not to seek to assign responsibility to any specific
individual.７２）
Thus did the echoes of the shots that ended an obscure former
bandit’s life reverberate almost into the last decade of the 20th century.
On the significance of this document and the events it referred to,
Wang Xiaozhong, a member of the Central Advisory Commission’s
secretariat who had taken part in the collating of the Commission’s
findings, reflected ruefully twenty years later:
“At numerous points in the history of the Chinese Communist
Party, major disagreements have burst to the surface, all of them
permeated by vicious and murderous fratricidal conflict. The cruelty
revealed in these intra－Party struggles is equal to that shown in any
life－and－death struggle with an external enemy. However, the damage
caused by these struggles to the broad mass of the Party membership
and to the Party itself is in fact greater than that caused by any
external conflict.”７３）
＊＊＊
Taken together, the Sanjiayuan Incident and the Li Qingdong affair
show the Party’s enduring sensitivity to its legacy of recruiting bandits to
the revolution. While current circumstances may have demanded such a
policy, and certain leaders like Liu Zhidan and Mao Zedong been highly
sanguine regarding its potential, the opprobrium with which Chinese
society regarded bandits made their recruitment to the revolution a far
more complex issue than it first appeared. Consequently, the vast majority
of materials on Liu Zhidan, particularly biographical materials, omit this
aspect of his revolutionary strategy altogether. Part 2 of this essay, after
introducing the way in which Liu’s biographers have tiptoed around this
important aspect of his Shaanbei heritage, will take up a number of other
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‘Bros in the ‘Hood’ whose connection to Liu Zhidan brought them face to
face with the revolutionary movement in Shaanbei (with varying results).
＊Xu Youwei’s research for this article was supported by the Leading
Academic Discipline Project of Shanghai Municipal Education Commission,
Project Number: J５０１０６．
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331, 404, 446, 472；1930－1931：35－36；1932, vol. 2：327－328.
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５２）李振民等 2001：131；戴茂林・超暁光 2011：33－35.
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Zhao Erwa’s execution. See 馬佩勛 1997： 470；岱峰 1997： 424； 楊丕勝 1995：
341. Elsewhere, however, Yang Peisheng relates that he could not see clearly who
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６１）姜兆 1995：323；張占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６３）See, for example, 雷恩釣 1997： 486； 呉岱峰 1997： 424. According to Yang
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６４）馬雲沢 1997：481.
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ABSTRACT
Since the appearance of Edgar Snow’s Red Star Over China , the
achievements of Liu Zhidan (劉志丹) in blending revolutionary ideals with
the destructive energy of north Shaanxi’s bandit tradition have become
well known. Through repeated failures and recoveries, Liu Zhidan
perceived that 20th－century China’s ubiquitous violence left no alternative
for the communists but to seek a military solution. The key to
revolutionary success in China was an empowered peasantry fighting in
the name of a shared ideal, and Liu Zhidan recognized that, in the remote
areas in which the communists sought to “rest their buttocks”, armed
forces such as those of local bandits and brotherhoods could not be ignored.
How to win those forces over to the revolutionary cause, or, failing
that, how to nullify and eventually eliminate them became a major
strategic problem for Liu and for other early communist militants.
Regularly condemned for his attention to such irregular fighters, Liu
Zhidan saw that, under the circumstances, they were all “Bro’s in the
’Hood”, and that the key to creating a successful revolutionary movement
in China was to bring people together, not to isolate them.
This paper will examine Liu Zhidan’s activities in “Shaanbei” from 1928
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to 1932, particularly his contacts with bandits and other local power－
holders. It will suggest, among other things, that Liu Zhidan’s policy of
recruiting bandits to the revolutionary movement was anything but plain
sailing. While some bandit chiefs were instinctively amenable to the
revolutionary call, others became Liu Zhidan’s worst enemies. At the same
time, the resistance Liu encountered from his fellow－revolutionaries was
often fierce, leading to purges and, ultimately, to what deserves to be
termed judicial murder.
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